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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 981793-CA

:
Priority No. 2

LETHRON D. TATE,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the revocation of his felony probation pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether this case should be remanded to the trial court for a finding of good
cause to admit hearsay evidence or to allow defendant an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses whose hearsay statements were relied upon by the trial court in finding that
defendant violated the terms of his probation.
There is no applicable standard of review.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(d) (1998) provides:
(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the
affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted robbery, a third degree felony,
and was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison. The sentence was stayed and defendant was
placed on probation for three years, beginning on April 27, 1997 (R.27-28).
On August 26, 1998, an amended Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
was filed alleging that defendant violated the terms of his probation by committing the
offenses of aggravated assault and forgery (R.51-54). On October 27, 1998, an
evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court found that defendant had violated the
terms of his probation. The trial court ordered that the original prison sentence be
imposed (R.64-65).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The affidavit submitted by defendant's probation officer, Jim Franson, in support
of the Order to Show Cause alleged that defendant violated the terms of his probation
2

by committing two offenses: aggravated assault and forgery (R.53-54). At the hearing
on these allegations, the prosecutor called three witnesses, all of whom were police
officers who had investigated the offenses.
Officer Richard L. Boddy testified in support of the forgery allegation. He
described his investigation, including conversations with witnesses who described
defendant's participation in a scheme to pass stolen checks at a Denny's Restaurant
where defendant worked (R.88:3-14). Boddy testified that one of defendant's coworkers identified defendant as having provided the stolen checks, which defendant
filled out and gave to the co-worker to cash during their shift at Denny's (R.88:10-13).
Officers Gilbert Salazar and Kelly Kent testified in support of the aggravated
assault allegation. Salazar stated that he responded to a call regarding an assault in
parking lot of a fast food restaurant. When he arrived at the parking lot, he found the
victim, Steven Hanson, who had facial and head injuries, and took him to the hospital
(R.88:29-30). He also spoke with a witness named Josh who identified his friend
"Tate" as having assaulted Hanson (R.88:31).
Officer Kent testified that he conducted a follow-up investigation of the assault.
Kent spoke with Josh Marquette, who told Kent that he and some friends were in the
parking lot when some words were exchanged over a Jazz game, and that an individual
named "Lee" or "Lethron" committed the assault on Hanson (R.88:34). Kent also
spoke with Josh Wagstaff, a restaurant employee, who confirmed the same story
3

(R.88:35). Officer Kent further testified that he spoke with Hanson regarding the
incident. Hanson described the nature of his injuries, including unconsciousness due to
a "brain hemorrhage" (R.88:36). He told Kent that at the time of the assault, there
were "some exchanges of words," and a black male had hit him "out of nowhere"
(R.88:36). Officer Kent testified that Hanson was able to identify defendant as the one
who hit him, using a six photo lineup (R.88:36).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court in this case did not make explicit findings with regard to the need
for hearsay testimony to be admitted in support of the probation revocation, and the
record does not provide an apparent basis for such a ruling. Accordingly, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to perform the balancing required in order to
justify the use of hearsay evidence or, in the alternative, to allow defendant an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose hearsay statements were relied upon
in revoking defendant's probation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court held that due
process required that a parolee be given certain minimal procedural protections in the
context of a parole revocation. "What is needed is an informal hearing structured to
assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the
4

exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's
behavior." Id. at 484.l The Court found that one of the requirements of due process in
this context is "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)." Id. at
489.
This requirement has been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(d)(iii)
(1998), which provides that in probation revocation proceedings where the defendant
denies the allegations, "[t]he persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders." See also Lay ton City v.
Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah App. 1990) (due process requires that a
probationer be allowed opportunity to confront adverse witnesses in a probation
revocation hearing, unless good cause is found); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1056
(Wyo. 1981) ("the state must make a good-faith attempt to produce the witnesses at a
probation or parole-revocation hearing or else show cause why they cannot appear").
The State does not dispute that hearsay evidence was used to support the
allegations of the petition to revoke defendant's probation, and that the trial court did

1

The principles announced in Morrissey with regard to parol revocation were
explicitly held applicable to probation revocation in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973).
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not justify such use by making a finding of good cause. See R.88:2-3. Although it
would be appropriate for this Court to examine the record on appeal to see if good
cause for the use of hearsay existed, there is no evidence in the record on this issue.
See Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299 n.3.
A finding of good cause requires the trial court to balance the defendant's
interest in cross-examining a witness against the State's need to use a particular hearsay
statement. See United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1995) (the trial
court is to "weigh 'the defendant's interest in confronting a particular witness against
the government's good cause for denying it, particularly focusing on the 'indicia of
reliability' of a given hearsay statement.'"); United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 64243 (8th Cir. 1986) (balancing test described, including an assessment of the explanation
offered as to why live testimony is impractical, and an evaluation of the reliability of
the evidence and the likely benefits of confrontation for defendant).
Defendant argues that the hearsay evidence used in this case could never be
properly relied upon, see Brief of Appellant, pp. 19-24, but overstates the nature of the
confrontation rights afforded a defendant in a probation or parole revocation
proceeding. In characterizing the standard for admitting hearsay evidence, defendant
relies almost exclusively on cases questioning the use of such evidence in a criminal
trial, not in a probation revocation proceeding, which has a different standard of due
process. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 ("We emphasize there is no thought to equate
6

[a parole revocation hearing] to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow
inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters,
affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal
trial.").
Thus, although the use of hearsay testimony of a co-conspirator might implicate
special concerns, the fact that information was obtained from a co-conspirator does not
render it inadmissible if a proper showing of need and reliability is made. United
States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1994) (although "an accomplice's
confession implicating the accused is viewed with special suspicion," the court found
that the accomplice's hearsay statement was sufficiently reliable to be admissible, if the
government could offer "a reasonably satisfactory explanation" for not bringing him in
as a witness). In addition, the issues raised by defendant with regard to the statements
of a co-conspirator do not apply at all to the trial court's finding in this case that
defendant committed an aggravated assault, which was based essentially on the officers'
non-hearsay testimony regarding the nature of the victim's injuries and a photo line-up
identification of defendant by the victim. See Harris v. United States, 612 A.2d 198,
200-01 (D.C. App. 1992) (one of two probation violations found by trial court upheld,
which was sufficient by itself to affirm probation revocation).
The trial court did not evaluate or make findings as to the reliability of the
specific hearsay statements used by the State in this case, and did not balance
7

defendant's need to cross-examine the witnesses against the State's need to rely on their
statements. Although defendant argues that the evidence in this case is unreliable for
various reasons, the trial court did not make any findings as to the reliability of specific
hearsay statements admitted at the hearing, and no facts were presented regarding the
State's need to rely upon the evidence. A probation revocation may be based solely
upon hearsay, see State v. Miller, 888 P.2d 399, 407-08 (Kan. App. 1995), and hearsay
witness identifications such as those at issue here have been held properly admitted
upon a finding that the witnesses are unavailable. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 145
Cal.Rptr. 334 (Cal. App. 1978).
Accordingly, the appropriate disposition of this matter is to remand to the trial
court for findings regarding the relative reliability of specific statements as balanced
against a particularized showing of need by the State. Miller, 888 P.2d at 406 (trial
court failed to make good cause finding for use of hearsay, case remanded); Zentgraf,
20 F.3d at 911 (case remanded to district court "in order for it to reopen the revocation
hearing, at which the government shall have the opportunity to produce [the accusing
witness] as a live witness or show good cause for not producing him."); State v.
Zeisler, 483 N.E.2d 493, 496-97 (Ohio App. 1984) (State conceded that no good cause
shown for use of hearsay in probation revocation hearing, case remanded "for
rehearing in order that defendant be afforded his right of confrontation of witness or
witnesses."); Commonwealth v. Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 624 (Penn. 1975) (remand for
8

new probation revocation hearing is appropriate if no good cause found for use of
hearsay).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
findings as to the existence of good cause for the use of hearsay evidence, or to allow
defendant to cross-examine the witnesses upon which the State relies.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisO^day of June, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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